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Ever since Lazarsfeld and his colleagues’ (1944) seminal study, it has become common
wisdom that election campaigns, if anything, serve the activation of voters’ fundamental
predispositions. However, disagreement emerges on the role of partisan orientations.
Although some authors consider them as fundamental predispositions, which are
activated during the campaign and subsequently act as filters for incoming information,
others argue that party attachments are simple running tallies of political assessments,
which are constantly updated in response to campaign events, or decision shortcuts
for voters innocent of substantial information. In this study, we scrutinize the role of
partisan orientations in a direct-democratic campaign using data from a panel survey
fielded during the run-up to the 2006 Swiss asylum law referendum. We find that, as
voters accumulate knowledge in the course of the campaign, vote intentions dramatically
converge on pre-campaign partisan orientations. Moreover, voters, whose earlier issue-
specific and partisan orientations collide, tend to resolve their ambivalence in favour
of their partisan leanings. These results corroborate the view of partisanship as a
fundamental predisposition.
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Introduction
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet’s (1944) The People’s Choice has frequently
been cited as the source originator of what has become known as the ‘minimal
effects paradigm’, that for a long time pervaded – or, according to Bartels (1993:
267), even embarrassed – political communications research. Initially unnoticed,
however, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues already pointed to significant campaign
effects in that ‘political campaigns are important primarily because they activate
latent predispositions’ (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet’s, 1944: 74). More recently,
the idea that campaigns help voters make decisions in line with their pre-existing
preferences, has been picked up by other scholars who provide considerable evidence
* Email: peter.selb@uni-konstanz.de
155
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175577390900006X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:02:59, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
that activation effects actually do occur during the course of campaigns (for an
overview, see Iyengar and Petrocik, 1998; Iyengar and Simon, 2000; Bartels,
2006). For instance, Finkel (1993) shows that individual changes in candidate
preferences over the course of the 1980 United States Presidential elections
campaign, predominantly affected voters whose initial preferences were incongruent
with their predispositions, as measured by race and party identification. In the same
connection, Gelman and King (1993) find that voters generally assigned more
weight to such fundamental variables as the campaign progressed. Finkel and
Schrott (1995) show that similar patterns emerged in the 1990 German Bundestag
election campaign. For Great Britain, Andersen, Tilley, and Heath (2005) show that
the predictive strength of class, religion, education, and personal ideology system-
atically varied over the electoral cycles 1992–97 and 1997–2001, and peaked during
the campaign. Finally, Arceneaux’s (2006) cross-national study of nine European
countries also reveals activation effects as the election days approach. The empirical
evidence that campaigns help voters learn about the electoral relevance of their
fundamental predispositions is thus relatively unambiguous.
Disagreement exists, however, with respect to the role of partisan orientations.
Although most authors consider party attachments as fundamental predisposi-
tions that, once activated, guide political judgment and voting behaviour (e.g.
Finkel, 1993; Gelman and King, 1993; Finkel and Schrott, 1995; Holbrook, 1996;
Iyengar and Petrocik, 1998; Hillygus and Jackman, 2003), others claim that party
attachments merely serve as decision short cuts for voters innocent of substantial
political information (Andersen, Tilley, and Heath, 2005; Arceneaux, 2006).
This dissent is hardly surprising, as the former authors argue from the perspective
of U.S. presidential election campaigns where partisan orientations have to be
translated into candidate preferences, whereas, the latter’s focus is on parliamentary
elections where voters face choices between parties. Consequently, this translation
task seems trivial indeed. To some extent, however, it also reflects a more funda-
mental debate about the very meaning and nature of party identification (for an
overview see, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002). In particular, proponents of a
‘traditional’ perspective conceptualize partisanship as a primarily affective attach-
ment to a political party that develops at an early stage through parental influences,
remains largely stable throughout life, is more or less immune to situational factors,
and acts as an organizing principle for other political perceptions, attitudes, and
behaviours (e.g. Bartels, 2002). The ‘revisionist’ camp, on the other hand, conceives
of party identification as an endogenous ‘running tally’ of personal party evalua-
tions that is constantly updated in response to incoming information (e.g. Fiorina,
2002). Clearly, partisan leanings qualify as fundamental predispositions according
to the former notion only.
In this paper, we scrutinize the role of partisan orientations in a direct-democratic
campaign where voters decide on policy propositions, not parties or candidates.
Thus, partisan predispositions and electoral choices do not carry the flavour
of tautology potentially inherent in studies of parliamentary and presidential
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elections. Although learning how one’s own partisan leaning relates to the choices
at stake is a non-trivial task in direct legislation settings, such decision guidance is
probably all the more important, as voters frequently face complex propositions
of which they lack detailed knowledge. These features qualify direct legislation
elections as a particularly fruitful ground for study. If partisan orientations indeed
acted as fundamental predispositions in such settings, we would expect voters to
use campaign information to learn about their parties’ stances on the issues at
stake, and to align their policy choices accordingly. Moreover, we would expect
partisan orientations to serve as a ‘perceptual screen’ that saves voters from
ambivalences because of conflicting preferences (e.g. Bartels, 2002).
In the following section, we will lay out the theoretical argument in some detail.
Subsequently, we will offer some background information on our empirical case,
the 2006 Swiss asylum law referendum, before we describe our data and empirical
model. This sets the stage for the presentation of the empirical results. We sum-
marize our findings in conclusion.
Theory
Activation theory suggests that campaigns are information-rich events that
remind the prospective voters of the electoral relevance of their fundamental
predispositions (Gelman and King, 1993). According to Bartels (2006), the
activation of partisan predispositions by a political campaign takes different
forms: first, and most directly, the impact of partisan predispositions on vote
intentions could increase over the course of the campaign. Second, campaigns
might strengthen partisan attachments. Finally, the evaluations of additional
explanatory factors, such as candidates, issues and economic conditions, could
come increasingly to reflect more basic partisan predispositions. In his analysis of
partisan activation in American presidential elections, Bartels (2006) finds modest
evidence of the direct effect, but hardly any evidence of the other two effects.
He concludes: ‘Taken together, these three sets of results provide remarkably
little evidence of partisan activation in recent general election campaigns’.
As opposed to parliamentary and presidential elections, referendums are
usually one-time events, frequently involving choices between unfamiliar and
complex alternatives. Thus, the learning process of the campaign becomes critical
in determining individual choices and aggregate referendum outcomes (see
LeDuc, 2002; Hobolt, 2006, 2007). We would therefore expect to find more
substantial evidence of partisan activation, particularly in ‘election-like’ refer-
endums where the battle lines between proponents and adversaries of a policy
correspond to traditional, ideological, and partisan cleavages. Correspondingly,
we expect that voters learn about the parties’ and, in particular, their preferred
party’s stances on the issue at stake (hypothesis 1), and that this partisan
knowledge will help the voters to connect their partisan predispositions to their
electoral choices (hypothesis 2).
Partisan choices in a direct-democratic campaign 157
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175577390900006X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:02:59, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
In addition to partisan orientations, the set of fundamental predispositions may
also include issue-specific values and attitudes. The voters also need to find out how
the proposition submitted to the vote relates to these values and attitudes, and
which choice best serves to do them justice.1 Typically, partisan and issue-specific
orientations tend to be consistently aligned in the individuals’ minds, but this need
not always be the case. To the extent that voters are aware of a mismatch between
their partisan and their issue-specific orientations, they are likely to be cross-
pressured or ambivalent with respect to the voting choice (Alvarez and Brehm,
1995, 2002; Rudolph, 2005). Accordingly, we expect ambivalent voters to translate
their partisan orientations into vote choices less consistently than do voters whose
partisan and issue-specific predispositions chime well together (hypothesis 3). In
line with this literature, we may also expect the effect of ambivalence to be
amplified by issue-specific knowledge (hypothesis 4; see Zaller and Feldman, 1992;
Rudolph and Popp, 2007). By contrast, we expect partisan knowledge to serve as
a means of reducing the effects of ambivalence (hypothesis 5). In line with the
traditional perspective of partisanship, we expect partisan predispositions to be
typically very salient and to predominate incompatible issue-related attitudes by
default. Reviewing a considerable amount of literature, Sniderman and Levendusky
(2007: 451) suggest that voters strive for consistency, and that the way they resolve
cross-pressures will, more often than not, be guided by party loyalty: ‘Of course,
some cast away their partisan attachments when new policies conflict with their
political convictions. More commonly, though, party identification is their anchor,
and it is their views on issues – even on hot-button issues such as abortion – that
swing around to be consistent with their party loyalties, not the other way around’.
Data and methods
The campaign under investigation is the referendum against the revised asylum
law, which took place on September 24, 2006. On this issue, the left and the
conservative right were diametrically opposed to each other with the moderate
right siding with the conservatives, forming a centre–right coalition defending the
proposal that was challenged by the referendum of the left. The proposition thus
reflected traditional partisan divides, and should therefore make up a suitable
empirical case to study partisan mobilization. Moreover, it is a familiar issue
as there have been no less than three earlier votes on asylum law over the last
1 As the focus of our attention in this paper is on the activation of partisan predispositions, we are not
studying the way this issue-specific knowledge connects the voters’ issue-specific predispositions to their
electoral choices. Instead, we suggest that issue-specific knowledge also serves to connect their partisan
predispositions to their electoral choices. This hypothesis, in a sense, inverses the usual perspective of
political psychological approaches, which suggests that partisan cues serve as short-cuts for the decision-
making of those who do not have sufficient issue-specific knowledge. By contrast, we are suggesting that
issue-specific knowledge, which the voters acquire during the campaign, may help to clarify the rela-
tionship between their partisan predispositions and the choice at hand.
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10 years – a vote in April 1987, one in June 1999 (involving two proposals),
and one in November 2002. The first two votes concerned referendums by
organizations from the left against the toughening of the asylum law, the last
one an initiative of the conservative right, which attempted to introduce a
further turning of the screw into this legislation. In addition, over the same period
of time, there had been eight more votes dealing with immigration issues, all of
which were concerned with the question of the restrictiveness of the immigration
policy.
Our analysis of the effect of the campaign is based on individual-level data
collected in a three-wave panel. The sample of 1725 randomly selected Swiss
citizens was interviewed before the beginning of the campaign (4–20 July), at the
height of the campaign (28 August–2 September), and immediately after the vote
(25–30 September).2
Owing to our specific focus on the effect of pre-campaign partisan orientations
on the vote, we only include respondents who indicate some partisan preferences
at the beginning of the campaign (see below) and have a vote intention (at t1 and
t2) or who have cast a valid vote (at t3). The additional exclusion of undecided
(at t1 and t2) and abstaining (at t3) voters simplifies our model specifications.3
For our models, we are left with 1314 of the original 1725 (76%) respondents.
Each of these respondents constitute an observation for each panel wave in
which she participated, which means that the estimation of our models is based
on 3449 observations.4 Descriptive statistics of the variables used can be found
in Appendix.
2 The sample is not characteristic of the Swiss citizens in one important respect: the active voters are
heavily over-represented. Thus, the participation rate in the federal vote of this group reaches 87.6%,
compared with only 48.4% of the citizens who participated. This over-representation of active citizens is
partly an attrition effect – active citizens are more ready to participate repeatedly in a study on politics;
partly it is attributable to the general selectivity of surveys about political issues in Switzerland. The post-
electoral survey of a representative sample held immediately after the federal vote indicated a partici-
pation rate of 63%. However, the sample is representative with regard to the actual voting outcome, as is
indicated by the comparison between the result of the vote of the sample (65% in favour of the law) and
that of the actual vote (68%).
3 We are aware that the exclusion of the 5–12% undecided voters (as well as the exclusion of those
abstaining from the referendum in general) will potentially bias our inferences on knowledge effects, as
differential levels of knowledge may govern the decision to refrain from a decisive choice. As stressed by
Matsusaka (1995), it is the voter’s subjective belief about her information or knowledge level that
determines her participation. This means that the level of knowledge has a systematic effect on the
turnout and on the probability of belonging to the undecided respondents. However, such self-selection
will probably bias our estimates of knowledge effects in the conservative direction; an eventuality we are
willing to accept.
4 Dropouts led to attrition rates of 10% between waves 1 and 2, and 19% between waves 2 and 3.
The random intercepts model of the vote to be set up in one of the following sections is robust against
panel effects because of attrition, given that relatively mild assumptions regarding the attrition process
apply (see Vella and Verbeek, 1994; Vella, 1998). As a more direct control of attrition effects, we have
also fitted the models to the sample of the 953 respondents who participated in all three panel waves, with
essentially similar results.
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Vote intention/vote choice
Our dependent variable is the vote intention (waves 1 and 2) and the reported
vote (wave 3) for the referendum on the asylum law. For the first two panel-
waves, the specific questionnaire item reads as follows: ‘If there were a ballot
tomorrow, would you strongly be in favour, rather in favour, rather against or
strongly against the toughening of the asylum law?’ Being (strongly or rather) in
favour of the new asylum law is coded as 1, and being (rather or strongly) against
as 0. For the third wave, the questionnaire item read: ‘How did you vote? Did you
agree or reject the asylum law?’ Again, agreement is coded as 1 and rejection as 0.
The mean of the dependent variable decreases from the first (0.66) to the second
panel wave (0.61), and increases again afterwards (to 0.65). This means that a
two-thirds majority of our sample eventually accepted the toughening of the
asylum law, which is very close to the official result of the vote in September 2006
(0.68 support for the new law).
Partisan predispositions
Although predispositions are usually conceived as being particularly strong,
structured, and stable sets of beliefs and attachments to political objects (e.g. Zaller
and Feldman, 1992), we will, for the sake of measurability, define partisan pre-
dispositions somewhat less-strictly in terms of the likes and dislikes of political
parties before an election campaign. Standard survey measures of party identifi-
cation have been criticized for neglecting dimensionality issues involved when
voters evaluate different parties (see, e.g., Weisberg, 1980; Greene, 2005). In par-
ticular, it has been argued that liking one party does not necessarily imply disliking
another. This critique should apply to an even larger extent in multi-party settings
(e.g. Tillie, 1995). Thus, when measuring partisan predispositions, one has to take
the voters’ orientations towards different parties into account. This is the reason
why, following Tillie (1995) and van der Eijk et al. (2006), we have chosen to
operationalize the partisan preferences on the basis of a set of questions asking the
respondents to indicate how likely it is that they will ever vote for each one of the
four major Swiss parties – the Social Democrats (SPS), Christian-Democrats (CVP),
the Liberals (FDP or LPS),5 and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) – as well as for
the Green party (GPS). The responses range from ‘will never vote for this party’
(score 0) to ‘will certainly vote for this party at some time in the future’
(score 10).6 On the basis of this information, we have mapped both parties
and voters onto a single latent scale using a non-parametric multiple unidimen-
sional unfolding technique (cf. Coombs, 1964; Van Schuur, 1993).
5 The probability that somebody will ever vote for the Liberals is the maximum value from two
different probabilities: The first is the probability that somebody will ever vote for FDP, the second for
LPS (present only in the French-speaking part of the country and in the Canton of Basel City).
6 These questions have been asked only once, at the beginning of the campaign, as our aim is to
determine to which extent voters converge on their pre-campaign partisan predispositions.
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Conceptually, unidimensional unfolding models are closely related to the
Downsian notion of proximity-based voter utilities: voters prefer parties close to
their own ideal point on a latent ideological continuum (Downs, 1997). Using
voters’ preference orderings among parties, non-parametric unfolding models rank-
order both parties and voters on a latent dimension.7 Subsequently, the achieved
party ordering can be tested against the null hypothesis that the parties are
not represented along the latent scale in terms of their rank in the unfoldable order.8
Not surprisingly, the unfolding model unveils a rank ordering of the five parties from
left to right that matches conventional wisdom (GPS, SPS, CVP, FDP and SVP).
As the H-value (0.62) and its corresponding t-test in Table 1 indicate, the partisan
preference rankings in our case correspond to the assumption of unidimensionality,
far in excess of what might occur by chance. The H(i)-values indicate that all parties
conform to the assumed ordering. P(i) is the percentage of respondents who
attributed a voting probability higher than five to the respective party.
Ambivalence
The construction of our ambivalence measure is based on a ‘xenophobia’-scale that
measures the respondent’s positioning on questions about their perception of
threats by foreigners, which were posed in the first panel wave (t1). The respon-
dents were asked whether they strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree
or strongly disagree with a series of five statements about threat perception
Table 1. Results from the multiple unidimensional unfolding (MUDFOLD)
analysis of the probabilities to vote
P(i) H(i) Obs. err. Exp. err.
SVP 0.36 0.62 6908 17,970
FDP 0.47 0.62 7885 20,648
CVP 0.44 0.60 8635 21,613
SPS 0.47 0.61 8274 21,379
GPS 0.40 0.63 7244 19,570
N5 1643, H5 0.62, P,0. 001.
SPS5 Social Democrats; CVP5Christian-Democrats; FDP5 the Liberals; SVP5 the Swiss
People’s Party; GPS5 the Green party.
7 Respondents who do not attribute a utility higher than five to any of the six parties, plus the (very
few) respondents who attribute equal preferences to all the parties, are considered not to have any
particular partisan predisposition and, accordingly, are dropped from the analysis.
8 We have used MUDFOLD 4.0 for our analysis (see van Schuur and Post, 1998). MUDFOLD
provides a goodness-of-fit measure, Loevinger’s H-coefficient, which can be used to test the null
hypothesis of independence and to evaluate the strength of the scale. When the data perfectly conform to
an unfolding scale, H is equal to 1.0; when the data are statistically independent, H is equal to 0. H can be
calculated both for the entire scale and for each individual party in its scale position (Van Schuur, 1987).
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(see Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior, 2004).9 Using principle components, we
have extracted a single factor from the five items with an Eigenvalue of 3.33 and
factor loadings of 0.78 or higher.10 For interpretational convenience, this xeno-
phobia scale has been standardized so that its mean is 0 and its std. dev. is 1.
A linear regression of xenophobic attitudes on partisan predispositions reveals that
there is a positive effect with an R2 of about 0.20 between the two predispositions.
This effect is, however, weak enough to suggest relatively high levels of ambivalence.
There are several options to measure ambivalence. We adopted the widespread
practice to infer ambivalence indirectly from responses on scales that measure
different orientations and coded it as follows: Ambivalence takes the same value as
the xenophobic predisposition for voters close to the Social democrats or the Green
party. These parties had launched the referendum against the proposed tightening of
the law and mobilized for its rejection during the campaign. For voters close to the
moderate or conservative right, ambivalence corresponds to the negative value of
their xenophobic predisposition. These parties had recommended acceptance of
the proposal and campaigned in its favour. Thus, the ambivalence measure oper-
ationalizes the conflict between the recommendations of the parties closest to the
voters’ ideal points and their xenophobic attitudes.11
Issue-specific knowledge
Issue-specific knowledge is measured by a Rasch model, a frequently utilized
psychometric scaling technique for dichotomous items (Rasch, 1980). It is based
on three factual questions testing the respondents’ knowledge of three particularly
contested aspects of the law. The possible answers were ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘don’t
know’.12 This set of questions has been surveyed at each wave. The Rasch model
maps both voters (according to their knowledge) and items (according to their
9 The five statements concerned individual safety threat (‘I am afraid of increasing violence and
vandalism in my neighbourhood by foreigners’), individual economic threat (‘I am afraid that my eco-
nomic prospects will get worse because of foreigners’), collective safety threat (‘I am afraid of increasing
violence and vandalism in Swiss society by foreigners’), collective cultural threat (‘These days, I am afraid
that the Swiss culture is threatened by foreigners’) and collective economic threat (‘I am afraid that the
economic prospects of Swiss society will get worse because of foreigners’).
10 As opposed to the construction of the partisan predisposition measure, factor analysis constitutes a
correct model here. In a nutshell, the conceptual difference between the two scales is that ‘unfoldable data
violate fundamental assumption of the factor analysis model. Factor analysis assumes that values of the
observed variables are linearly (or even monotonically) related to values on the underlying latent vari-
ables (Van Schuur and Kiers, 1994: 97).
11 Our measure is substantially correlated (0.73) with a measure constructed along the lines proposed
by Steenbergen and Brewer (2004: 104). For the purposes of this study, our measure seems more ade-
quate, because it more directly addresses the conflict between partisan and issue-specific orientations at
stake.
12 The wording of the three factual questions is as follows: Does the new law require that asylum
seekers will only be admitted to a formal entrance procedure if they possess documents clarifying their
identity? (Yes). Does the new law allow asylum seekers, whose application was rejected, to be excluded
from social assistance? (Yes). Does the new law allow at all to consider requests from asylum seekers who
have the possibility to return to a safe third country? (No).
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difficulty) on the same latent continuum.13 Table 2 presents the estimates for the
item difficulty parameters and test statistics, confirming that the knowledge
questions do actually form a single latent continuum. Our measure of issue-
specific knowledge is then the estimated location of the individuals on that latent
trait by panel wave.14
Partisan knowledge
For measuring partisan knowledge, we inquired with each of the six parties we already
introduced above, whether or not the respondents knew their position with respect to
the new law.15 For operationalizing the relevant partisan cue, we took the respon-
dents’ knowledge with respect to the party closest to their own position (as measured
by the scale for partisan predisposition introduced above). The resulting indicator is a
dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the respondent knows the party’s position, and
0 otherwise.16 This variable, too, is measured at each one of the three points in time.
Figure 1 presents the development of these two knowledge measures during the
campaign.17 As expected (hypotheses 1 and 2), the general pattern is that people
Table 2. Results from a Rasch test of three issue-specific knowledge items
Item Difficulty SE R1c (1d.f.)a
Identity card 20.86 0.04 0.00
Welfare aid 20.42 0.03 8.10**
Third country 1.28 0.04 42.91***
R1c-test (d.f.)a 52.307***
LR-test (d.f.)b 47.087***
N 4234
aGlas’ first-order test for monotonicity.
bAnderen’s test that the estimates of the difficulty parameters are the same whatever the
respondents’ knowledge.
13 In contrast to the unfolding model, which assumes individuals to have ideal points on a latent
continuum, below and above which utilities for objects (parties) decrease, the Rasch model is cumulative
in nature, that is, it assumes a monotonically increasing latent trait (issue-specific knowledge) so that
individuals have a higher probability to cope with all the items (knowledge questions) that are located
below their own respective location on the latent scale.
14 For interpretational convenience and comparability, we have standardized the knowledge scores.
15 The question wording was: ‘I give you now the names of a number of political groups. Could you,
please, tell me whether these groups are in favour or against the asylum law, or whether they have taken a
neutral position?’ The possible responses were ‘in favour’, ‘against’, ‘neutral’, ‘don’t know’.
16 Partisan knowledge is also set to 0 when respondents are equally close to parties with conflicting
positions (i.e., they are located in the middle between the SPS and the CVP).
17 Note that all respondents are included in this descriptive presentation. Including only the respondents
who have answered all three waves does not modify the picture by much, which means that there are no
‘attrition’ effects in this sample. However, our panel estimates may also be plagued by ‘conditioning’ effects,
that is, by survey-induced learning. As we do not have a ‘fresh’ cross-section to compare our subsequent
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learn considerably in the course of the campaign. Knowledge of party positions in
fact increases linearly, whereas issue-specific knowledge has, above all, increased
during the first phase of the campaign. Note that knowledge is already relatively
high at the outset of the campaign – probably a consequence of the overall rather
high familiarity of the proposal.
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Figure 1 Campaign effects on issue-specific knowledge and knowledge of partisan cues.
waves’ results to, controlling for eventual conditioning effects turns out very difficult. However, explicit
studies of panel conditioning usually show relatively weak effects (e.g. Holt, 1989).
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An empirical model of the vote choice
It has been hypothesized and shown that direct-democratic campaigns inform
voters about the specific propositions at stake, as well as the stances the parties
and other political actors take on these propositions. In providing such infor-
mation, campaigns will, so runs the argument, help the voters to convert their
fundamental predispositions into consistent vote choices, but only as long as
their predispositions do not collide. If their predispositions collide, additional
information will probably activate the voters’ ambivalence, and will therefore
interfere in the process of translating predispositions into choices. One way or the
other, campaign information is hypothesized to not primarily affect the direction
of voters’ choices in terms of approval and rejection, but the variance of
the voters’ underlying distribution of choices given their predispositions. Standard
statistical models preclude such variance-altering types of effects by assumption,
and frequently yield inefficient or even inconsistent estimates in the presence of
heteroscedasticity. This problem can be addressed by directly modelling the
response heterogeneity. For example, Alvarez and Brehm (1995) develop a probit
variant of Harvey’s (1976) multiplicative heteroscedastic regression which
assumes the error variance to depend on explanatory variables (also see Alvarez
and Franklin, 1994; Alvarez and Brehm, 1995, 2002). The heteroscedastic probit
is our point of departure, although we will extend this model in capitalizing on
the panel structure of our data. Particularly, the repeated observation of voters
allows us to conceptualize unobserved inter-individual differences in the pro-
pensity to accept or reject the proposition at stake as a random variable.
Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in this way helps resolve some of the
fundamental problems of causal inference in non-experimental research settings
(see e.g. Finkel, 1995).18
We start with the latent variable derivation of the random intercept probit
model. In this model, y* is the unobserved propensity of voter i to agree on the
proposition at time t, so that the observed choice y will be 1 (approval) if y*. 0,
otherwise 0 (rejection). This propensity is considered a function of a constant a
that is specific to t, the partisan predispositions x of i measured at t5 1, a random
variable z representing unobserved time-invariant personal characteristics
affecting y*, for which we assume a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
t2, and e, a person–time specific error term:
yit ¼ at þ bxi þ zi þ it ð1Þ
18 In the same vein, including random intercepts in the model may also implicitly correct systematic
panel attrition under relatively lax assumptions concerning the attrition process (see Vella and
Verbeek, 1994; Vella, 1998). As a more direct control of attrition effects, we have also fitted the
models to the sample of respondents who participated in all three panel waves, with essentially similar
results.
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If we assume a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance (s2) for e, the
model becomes a random intercept probit model:
Prðyit ¼ 1jxi; zit; ziÞ ¼ F
at þ bxi þ zi
sit
 
ð2Þ
where F(  ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The standard
probit model is usually identified by fixing the std. dev. s at 1. However, we have
hypothesized that the variance (or, equivalently, the std. dev.) of the vote function
that links predispositions to choices is a function of a vector of covariates z:
sit ¼ expðgzitÞ ð3Þ
where z includes different sets of variables for different model specifications. In
Model 1, we will only include dummy variables for panel waves 2 and 3 to capture
the overall variance-altering effect of the campaign. The variance (std. dev.) in wave 1
is fixed at 1 to identify the model. If the campaign helped the voters in translating
their predispositions into choices, we would expect negative effects of the wave
dummies on the standard deviation s. Model 2 additionally includes the respondents’
issue-specific and partisan knowledge. Again, we would expect knowledgeable voters
to exhibit less variance in their vote function, keeping their partisan predispositions
constant. Finally, model 3 adds our ambivalence measure in the heteroscedastic
model component. Additionally, we will allow ambivalence to interact with the
knowledge variables, as we have hypothesized that issue-specific knowledge will
potentially activate ambivalence. We would therefore expect a positive effect of
ambivalence on the variance of the systematic model component, and this effect
should be stronger for the voters with more issue-specific knowledge than for those
with knowledge about party positions.19
Results
Table 3 reports the estimates for the parameters of the three models. It is divided
into three sections: the first section provides the estimates for the choice function,
section two, those for the variance function and section three includes t2, the
variance estimate of the respondent-specific random intercept.
As documented by the parameters of the choice function, the partisan predis-
position has a positive effect on the vote intention (the vote) in all three models.
This means, that a predisposition for a right party increases the probability to vote
‘Yes’, that is, to agree with the new asylum law and vice versa. The negative
coefficients for t2 and t3 indicate that, given party preferences, voters have
become more inclined to cast a ‘No’ vote in the course of the campaign. Although
this may at first glance appear to provide evidence for a ‘directional’ or persuasive
campaign effect (Figure 2), which presents the predicted probabilities to cast a
19 We have fitted these models using gllamm, a Stata programme for generalized linear latent and
mixed models (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004).
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‘Yes’ vote as a function of the voters’ partisan predispositions (as measured at the
start of the campaign), it tells a different story: although the voters of the centre
and the right (CVP, FDP/LPS, and SVP) have been pretty consistent with their
parties’ stances all along, the activation of partisan predispositions has primarily
Table 3. Estimates from the random intercepts heteroscedastic probit models of
the vote choice
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Fixed part: choice function
Partisan predisposition 0.044*** 0.004 0.036*** 0.004 0.033*** 0.004
Intercept (5t1) 21.614*** 0.171 21.345*** 0.156 21.230*** 0.154
t2 20.249*** 0.058 20.166*** 0.048 20.145*** 0.046
t3 20.115 0.059 20.060 0.047 20.051 0.044
Fixed part: variance function
t2 20.494*** 0.132 20.349*** 0.134 20.369*** 0.136
t3 21.076*** 0.263 20.873*** 0.235 20.873*** 0.225
Partisan knowledge 20.524*** 0.117 20.611*** 0.135
Issue knowledge 20.063* 0.038 20.069 0.044
Ambivalence 0.207** 0.097
Issue knowledge*ambivalence 0.001 0.045
Partisan knowledge*ambivalence 20.217 0.143
Random part
Intercept variance 0.920*** 0.160 0.599*** 0.123 0.496*** 0.114
Log-likelihood 21605 21591 21589
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.10.
No. of respondents5 1314.
No. of observations5 3449.
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Figure 2 Predicted probabilities to cast a YES vote for partisan predisposition, before (t1),
during (t2) and after the campaign (t3).
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operated among the partisans of the left (SPS, GPS), getting them more and more
in line with their parties’ positions over the course of the campaign.
Considering the variance function in Model 1, we observe that at mid-campaign
(t2), the variance of the choice function that links partisan predispositions and
vote choice, considerably reduces from 1 to exp(20.49)250.37. In wave 3 (t3),
the corresponding variance reduces even further to exp(21.08)250.12. This is a
very strong empirical support for the activation effect of the campaign. Note that,
given Equation (2) above, the variance also has a ‘scaling’ effect on the probit
coefficients of the choice function. This means that a reduction in the variance
increases the effects of the coefficients in the choice function. This becomes clearly
visible in Figure 2. As the campaign proceeds, the choice function linking the
partisan preferences of the voters to their vote choice becomes increasingly steep,
which means that their partisan predispositions become much better predictors
for their vote – exactly as predicted by the activation hypotheses (H2).
From section 3 of Table 3, we learn that there is a highly significant variance of the
random intercept (0.92), which provides strong evidence of unobserved hetero-
geneity between the voters in their propensity to approve or reject the proposition.
This finding highlights the usefulness of panel data in non-experimental settings.
Model 2 introduces the two knowledge variables into the variance function, which
allows for a more explicit test of the activation hypothesis. As expected, knowledge
about the partisan cues (H2) reduces the variance of the choice function, given the
respondents’ partisan predispositions. The same also applies for issue-specific
knowledge (H2a). However, the latter effect is barely significant, which means that
issue-specific knowledge does contribute to the clarification of the relationship
between partisan predispositions and the choice at hand, but only to a much more
limited extent than partisan knowledge. Thus, knowing one’s party’s position reduces
the variance to exp(20.52)250.35, keeping the other variables constant at zero, but
having issue-specific knowledge, that is, one std. dev. above the mean only decreases
the variance to exp(20.06)250.89. At the same time, the introduction of the two
knowledge measures considerably reduces the effects of the wave dummies to
(20.35)/(20.49)50.71 of the initially estimated effect (Model 1) with regard to t2,
and to (20.87)/(21.08)50.81 with regard to t3. In other words, the knowledge
effects capture about 20–30 per cent of the initially observed overall campaign effect.
Obviously, there is considerable learning going on, which is not captured by our
knowledge variables. At the same time, the introduction of the knowledge variables
also reduces the random intercept variance by a proportion of (0.92–0.60)/0.9250.35.
This means that the knowledge differences between the individuals explain roughly
one-third of the unobservable inter-individual differences in voting choices.
Model 3 as well as its interactions with the two knowledge variables adds
ambivalence to the determinants of the variance function. The marginal effect of
ambivalence with the other variables at 0 turns out to be positive and significant,
which confirms hypothesis 3: ambivalence does, indeed, significantly increase the
unknowledgeable voters’ hesitancy about how to vote. However, increased substantial
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knowledge does not increase the effect of ambivalence. Thus, hypothesis 4 is not
confirmed. By contrast, the interaction effect between ambivalence and partisan
knowledge is, as expected, negative and is roughly of equal size as the effect of
ambivalence (although not quite significant because of a large standard error). In fact,
knowledge of partisan cues perfectly counteracts the effect of ambivalence on the
variance function. As illustrated in Figure 3, ambivalence increases the variance of the
vote function only among those who do not know their party’s position. Among those
who do, ambivalence has no effect at all, which provides support for hypothesis 5.
Discussion
Ever since Lazarsfeld and his colleagues’ seminal study, it has become common
wisdom that election campaigns, if anything, serve the activation of voters’ fun-
damental predispositions. The ‘enlightenment hypothesis’ (Gelman and King, 1993;
Arceneaux, 2006) re-stated that wisdom by pointing out that campaigns do not
change the citizens’ preferences but, by increasing the information about the voting
decision available to the voters, help them update their beliefs regarding the issues
at stake and allow them to reach a decision in line with their predispositions.
In the literature, disagreement exists with regard to the role of partisan orienta-
tions. Although some authors consider them as fundamental predispositions, which
are activated during the campaign and subsequently act as filters for incoming
information, others argue that party attachments are simple running tallies of
political assessments, which are constantly updated in response to campaign events.
In this study, where we analysed the role of partisan predispositions in a direct-
democratic campaign, partisan predispositions and voting choices do not carry
the flavour of tautology inherent in parliamentary and presidential elections. Our
results confirm the traditional view that partisan predispositions constitute, indeed,
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Figure 3 Predicted variances of the choice function for respondents with (solid line) and
without partisan knowledge (dotted line). Issue-specific knowledge set to its sample mean.
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fundamental predispositions: vote intentions dramatically converge on pre-cam-
paign partisan orientations over the course of the campaign. Moreover, ambivalent
voters, that is, voters who experience cross-pressures between their issue-specific
attitudes and their partisan predispositions, more often than not, resolve such
conflicts in favour of their partisan predispositions.
Although these activation effects turned out to be substantial in our empirical case
of the Swiss asylum law referendum 2003, we would expect them to be even
stronger with ballots propositions which are less familiar to the public but never-
theless polarize the political parties along traditional ideological divides. On the
other hand, we would hypothesize partisan activation to be weaker with ballot
measures that divide the political elites into ‘unholy’ alliances, for example, between
the environmentalist left and the conservative right (see LeDuc, 2002). In other
words, we would expect that the activation of partisan predispositions in direct-
democratic votes not only hinges upon individual factors such as knowledge and
ambivalence that have been scrutinized in our current study, but also on contextual
factors, such as the familiarity of the issues at stake, campaign intensity and balance,
and the configuration of the battle lines between proponents and adversaries (see
Kriesi, 2005). Recently, the NCCR Democracy, an interdisciplinary research pro-
gramme launched by the Swiss National Science Foundation,20 has fielded two
similar panel surveys on other ballot propositions that will allow, among other
things, to investigate the role of proposition-specific factors on the activation of
partisan predispositions during referendum campaigns.
Finally, in methodological terms, our results confirm that the campaign does not
primarily affect the direction of the voters’ choices in terms of approval and rejection,
but the variance of the voters’ underlying distribution of choices for given partisan
predispositions. More specifically, the campaign contributes to the knowledge about
party positions on the issue at stake and to issue-specific knowledge, both of which
reduce voters’ uncertainty as to how their partisan predispositions relate to the
proposition. On the basis of our empirical results, we support Braumoeller’s (2006)
recent claim that political scientists should broaden their understanding of causation
to include variance-altering types of causal effects.
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Appendix. Means and standard deviations of the variables by panel wave
Panel wave t1 t2 t3
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Vote choice 0.66 0.47 0.61 0.49 0.65 0.48
Partisan predisposition 51.63 18.97 51.39 18.94 51.45 18.94
Ambivalence 20.40 0.94 20.37 0.93 20.38 0.92
Partisan knowledge 0.51 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.69 0.46
Issue knowledge 20.25 1.61 0.50 1.51 0.82 1.36
N 1314 1182 953
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